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Commission v. Gazprom:  
The antitrust clash of the decade? 
Alan Riley 
No. 285, 31 October 2012 
1. Introduction 
It may well be that the Gazprom antitrust case1 
launched by DG Competition on September 4th 
will turn out to be the landmark antitrust case of 
this decade, as Microsoft2 was of the last decade. 
The argument of this paper is that, for a host of 
political and economic reasons, this case is likely 
to be hard fought by both sides to a final 
prohibition decision and then onwards into the 
EU courts. In the process, the European gas 
market and the powers of DG Competition in the 
energy field are likely to be transformed.3  
                                                   
1 “Commission Opens Proceedings against 
Gazprom”, 4 September 2012, Commission Press 
Release, IP/12/937. 
2 The Microsoft case law consists of the original 
prohibition decision including a fine of €497 million 
and a series of compliance orders in March 2004 (Case 
COMP/C-3/37.792, Microsoft), fixing penalty 
payments for non-compliance in July 2006 (involving 
an additional fine of €280.5 million) and February 
2008 (involving a further fine of €899 million), as well 
as judgment in favour of the Commission in 
September 2007, Case T-201/04 Microsoft v. 
Commission. The final judgment (again in favour of 
the Commission) with respect to the non-compliance 
cases was handed down in the summer of 2012, Case 
T-167/08 Microsoft v. Commission.  
3 The author suspects that given the potential 
resistance from Gazprom to comply with EU law 
even on the territory of the member states, DG 
Competition will need to fully explore the potential of 
 
In an ordinary energy antitrust case, the most 
likely option would be a quiet private settlement 
by an Article 9 ‘commitment decision’.4 That 
option is much less likely to be a realistic one in 
this case. The political and economic 
circumstances of this case are exceptional. 
Gazprom is under a substantial degree of 
structural and market pressure; its potential 
antitrust liability is significant and DG 
Competition is determined to ensure a genuine 
open single market in gas. It is open to question 
as to how far the Gazprom board and the 
Kremlin would ever be prepared to sufficiently 
compromise with the Commission in order for a 
Commitment Decision to be agreed. 
 
                                                                                     
the Union’s antitrust case law and legislation with 
respect to enforcement.  
4 Commitment decisions can be taken in antitrust 
cases where an investigated party is willing to 
cooperate with the Commission. Decisions are 
adopted under Art. 9 of Regulation 1/2003 (the 
Union’s core procedural regulation). For a discussion 
of the law on commitments, see H. Schweitzer, 
“Commitment Decisions in the EU and in the Member 
States: Functions and Risks of New Instruments of 
Competition Law Enforcement within a Federal 
Enforcement Regime”, E-Competitions Bulletin, 2 
August 2012.  
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2172237
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The case therefore may well be subject to a full 
European antitrust process; a prohibition 
decision with fines attached, a series of legal 
challenges by Gazprom to the EU General Court 
and onward to the European Court of Justice. 
Given the political resistance already evident in 
Moscow in the preliminary blocking statute,5 
there is also the potential for a series of parallel 
Commission non-compliance cases as in 
Microsoft.6 There are also grounds for believing 
that the Gazprom case may well generate 
interest in the Central and Eastern European 
Baltic states7 in deploying their own regulatory 
and civil law procedures against Gazprom. 
These national processes would be engaged 
against Gazprom in respect of antitrust liabilities 
incurred under national law prior to their 
accession to the European Union.8 
The potential landmark nature of the case flows 
first from the mixture of core antitrust issues, 
from illegal resale clauses to abusive denial of 
third party access to exploitative pricing, 
combined with a host of structural supply 
security and geostrategic questions. Secondly, its 
importance derives from the prospect that the 
case may lead to the dismantling of the Gazprom 
model as a network of long-term supply 
contracts linked to oil arranged with vertically 
integrated domestic energy incumbents and its 
                                                   
5 “Kremlin shields Gazprom from EU probe”, 
Financial Times, 11 September 2012. 
6 And potentially the prospect of significant penalties 
as in the Microsoft case for non-compliance. 
7 Hereafter when referring to Central and Eastern 
Europe, the Baltic states are included within the term. 
8 The Commission case only deals with antitrust 
liabilities from the 1st May 2004 when eight Central 
and Eastern European States entered the Union. 
However, as a result of the Europe Agreements 
signed in the early and mid-1990s the then Candidate 
Member States were required to adopt homologue 
competition law provisions into their national legal 
orders. Hence if there were continuing antitrust 
offences committed by Gazprom at the time of the 
launch of the Commission’s investigation, national 
authorities could seek to investigate the period prior 
to 1 May 2004 in parallel with the Commission’s 
investigation. However, what is not possible is for the 
Commission to investigate alleged antitrust offences 
prior to 1 May 2004. See Case C-17/10 Toshiba 
Corporation and others v. Úřad pro Ochranu Hospodářské 
Soutěže, ECJ 14 February 2012, nyr. 
final replacement with a single interconnected 
European gas market relying on gas to gas 
competition in a number of hubs. 
The Kremlin should really be deploying the 
antitrust case to force Gazprom to reform. 
Because of increased global gas liquidity, the 
economic crisis and consequent lack of 
affordability of the EU’s climate change strategy, 
the size of the European gas market will enlarge 
over the next decade. Russian gas companies 
could have a major role in an enlarged European 
market. However, to prosper in such an enlarged 
European gas market, the Russian market must 
itself be liberalised.  
As the case proceeds, it may well be that the 
modernisers in the Kremlin administration may 
obtain the upper hand and will be able to seek a 
settlement with the Commission. If they do not, 
then there is likely to be a major prohibition 
decision resetting their terms of business in the 
European Union, a host of ancillary litigation 
and at the end a very different European gas 
market from the one in which Gazprom 
currently operates. 
This paper is divided into six sections. The 
second section looks at Gazprom’s current 
market and structural vulnerability in the 
context of the shale gas revolution; section 3 puts 
the case in the context of the European 
Commission’s programme for the creation of a 
single market in gas, energy liberalisation and 
the maintenance of free competition across the 
Union. Section 4 examines the allegations made 
against Gazprom by the Commission and their 
implications. The 5th section considers the initial 
Russian reaction. And, in conclusion, the final 
section offers some proposals for the Russian 
government to reform its gas market, which may 
also then provide a basis for settlement with the 
Commission. The conclusion also considers the 
implications for EU-Russian relations should 
there be no settlement. 
2. Shale gas and the market 
vulnerability of Gazprom 
2.1 The power of Gazprom? 
The received view of Gazprom across the 
continent and beyond is as both an extremely 
commercially and politically powerful company. 
Its market dominance in the Central and Eastern 
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Europe States, its role as a key supplier of energy 
to Germany,9 Turkey10 and Italy11 reinforce that 
view of its commanding role on European gas 
markets. That commercial power has been 
matched by the exercise of political power: The 
study by Larsson of politically motivated cut-offs 
in the Central and East European states between 
1991 and 200412 demonstrates that the 
overwhelming majority of those cut-offs were 
gas related. More recently, the European Union 
has been affected by political disputes between 
Gazprom and the Ukrainian authorities, which 
have resulted in cut-offs and reduced gas flows 
to the Union in 200613 and 2009.14 
This economic and political power is 
underpinned by a network of long-term supply 
contracts with vertically integrated national 
energy incumbents. These long-term contracts 
include take and pay clauses and, allegedly, 
resale prohibition clauses. The contracts are not 
only for very long terms, often over 15 years, but 
also for the overwhelming majority of the 
customers’ requirements, in some cases as much 
as 100%. In addition, for most customers across 
the Central and Eastern European states, there 
are no alternative or only limited sources of gas 
to Gazprom supplies. Almost all pipelines run 
from East to West, as they were designed by 
Soviet planners, with little interconnection at all, 
until recently, between states across the region 
and with Western Europe. Gazprom and its 
allies have also sought to acquire downstream 
assets, which has had the effect of further 
underpinning their market power.15 
                                                   
9 Reuters, “Russian Gas Exports to Europe up 8% in 
2011” (Germany 34bcm). 
 10 Ibid. (25bcm). 
11 Ibid. (17bcm).  
12 R.L. Larsson, Russia’s Energy Policy Security 
Dimensions and Russia’s Reliability as an Energy 
Supplier, Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), 
Stockholm, 2006.  
13 J. Stern, The Russian-Ukrainian Gas Crisis of January 
2006, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (OIES), 
Oxford, 2006. 
14 J. Stern, S. Pirani and K. Yafimava, The Russo-
Ukrainian Gas Dispute of January 2009: A Comprehensive 
Assessment, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies 
(OIES), Oxford, 2009. 
15 K.C. Smith, A New Stealth Imperialism: Russian 
Energy Politics in the Baltics, Poland and Ukraine, CSIS, 
2.2 The impact of the shale gas 
revolution on the global LNG 
market 
It is now however very seriously open to 
question how far Gazprom will be able to sustain 
its commercial and political power.  The 
principal immediate threat to Gazprom is the 
impact of the shale gas revolution. This threat 
does not stem directly from shale gas production 
in Europe but rather from the impact of shale gas 
on the global LNG market. The initial damage to 
Gazprom from shale gas emanated from the 
‘shutout’ effect of US shale gas production. 
Essentially, shale gas production undermined 
the market for LNG in American markets and, as 
a consequence, led to the dumping of LNG on 
European spot markets. Gazprom had to offer 
significant price discounts in 2010 to a number of 
key customers in order to reduce its losses.16  
The impact of LNG dumping was blunted on 
European markets due to market liquidity 
draining away as a result of the Fukushima 
disaster, as Japanese demand for natural gas 
leapt after as the nuclear power station fleet was 
switched off. However, the trend toward greater 
access LNG resources for Europe is still clear. 
The growth in LNG production from shale and 
non-shale gas resources worldwide is growing 
rapidly with more production on its way from 
Australia, Canada and Qatar17. Australia may 
well replace Qatar as the world’s largest LNG 
producer. Worse still for Gazprom it is open to 
question how much LNG China will need as the 
decade progresses. The current Chinese five year 
plan provides for 6.5bcm by 2015 and 
ambitiously seeks to produce 60 to 100bcm by 
2020.18 There is a real danger for LNG producers 
that the US experience of continental wide 
‘shutout’ could be repeated in China and 
elsewhere as shale gas production gets 
underway at scale across the globe. 
                                                                                     
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
Washington, D.C., 2004, and Larsson, op. cit. 
16 Reuters, “Gazprom adjusts gas pricing to defend 
market share”, February 2010. 
17 BP Energy Outlook 2030, London, January 2012. The 
Outlook projects growth at 4.5% annually to 2030. 
18 “China sets Target for Shale Gas Development”, 
Financial Times, 16 March 2012. 
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2.3  Shale gas liquidity leading to coal 
dumping in Europe 
Gazprom and all other gas suppliers are already 
faced with a knock-on effect of the shale gas 
revolution; coal displaced in US markets is now 
finding its way into Europe.19 With low US gas 
prices coal which as recently as 2005 made up 
50% of US power generation, is now hovering 
just above 30%20 (which in large part explains 
why the US is cutting its CO2 emissions more 
rapidly than Europe).21 This has pushed the price 
of US coal down and into exports. One of the 
strategic threats for Gazprom (and other gas 
supply companies) is that US-style ‘shutouts’ are 
repeated round the world as shale gas 
production takes off and Europe becomes a 
dumping ground for cheap coal.  
2.4 Potential for shale gas to be 
exported as LNG from the US 
In addition, to the prospect of ‘shutout’ for LNG 
producers from domestic shale gas production, 
there is also the prospect of shale gas being 
exported as LNG. For Gazprom, the greatest 
danger would be significant exports of US shale 
gas into the European market. The difficulty here 
for Gazprom is that there is a compelling 
commercial incentive for US shale gas to be 
exported as LNG.22 Although some sections of 
                                                   
19 The first quarter of 2012 alone saw a 49% increase in 
US coal exports to the European Union (see 
http://www.eia.gov/coal/production/quarterly/pd
f/t9p01p1.pdf). 
20 R. Martin, “In Europe, Coal Regains its Crown”, 
Forbes, July 2012. 
21 International Energy Agency, “Global Carbon 
Dioxide Emissions Increase by 1.0Gt in 2011 to Record 
High”, May 2012 
(www.iea.org/newsroomandevents/news/2012/may/name,2
7216,en.html). 
22 It could be argued that US LNG will largely go to 
Asia given current Asian demand. However, when 
one takes account of a) Chinese projections of 
domestic shale gas production, b) Chinese domestic 
pipeline and gasification capacity, c) Australian, 
Canadian and Qatari liquefaction capacity and d) the 
potential of East African offshore gas resources, it is 
difficult to see how, even with the increase in the 
capacity of the Panama Canal from 2014, there can be 
a major Eastern Seaboard-Asia LNG trade from the 
proposed Eastern Seaboard liquefaction plants. There 
US industry have called for an export ban of 
shale gas in order to maintain low US gas prices, 
the overwhelming economic logic is for shale gas 
to be exported as LNG. The response to those 
seeking to maintain a ban on exports is that 
current US gas prices at $3.20 MMBTU 
(European prices range $10-14 MMBTU) are too 
low for many even cost-conscious US producers 
to maintain production. If US industry wants 
stable long-term gas prices, prices have to rise to 
still world competitive levels of $4 to $5 MMBTU 
to maintain production. As a consequence, there 
is a very compelling case to encourage a 
significant degree of shale gas export as LNG in 
order to provide greater profitability to US 
producers. In addition, such exports would add 
to US federal and local tax revenues and 
generate greater incomes for holders of the sub-
soil rights.23  
2.5 The impact of further offshore 
resources in or near Europe 
What also has to be factored into the calculations 
of supply liquidity are the prospects for the 
enormous East African and Eastern 
Mediterranean offshore gas resources, which are 
in the process of being developed.24 Nearer to 
home there is also the prospect of developing 
shale gas offshore in the North Sea.25 It is 
possible that for instance in the case of the 
                                                                                     
is in fact a good case for the alternative scenario of an 
over-supplied Asian market providing LNG via the 
Panama Canal into Europe. 
23 15 natural gas export licence applications are being 
considered by the US Department of Energy. Of those 
15, only one has been cleared so far, the Sabine Pass 
project run by Cheniere Energy. However, it is 
expected that after the Presidential election, these 
export licence applications will be considered by the 
new administration.   
24 For East Africa, see R. Sorkhabi, “East African 
Margin & SW Indian Ocean Basins Project Report 
2011-2012”, Energy and Geoscience Institute (EGI), 
University of Utah, 2012. For an overview of the 
prospects and difficulties of developing the Eastern 
Mediterranean resources see, D. Natali, “The Eastern 
Mediterranean Basin: A New Energy Corridor”, 
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), 
National Defense University, Washington, D.C, July 
2012.  
25 Reuters, “UK has vast shale gas reserves geologists 
say”, April 2012. 
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African offshore developments that capital may 
switch from some of the more expensive 
proposed Australian gas field developments to 
cheaper East African offshore prospects. The net 
effect of these discoveries will still be greater gas 
liquidity as the decade proceeds.26 
2.6 The trend towards greater gas 
liquidity 
Therefore, even without a single shale gas well in 
Europe coming into commercial production, 
Gazprom faces a significant impact from shale 
gas. There may well be instances of supplies 
scarcity, as after Fukushima, but the trend 
towards greater supply liquidity is clear. What 
also cannot be discounted is significant shale gas 
development in Europe itself. It would only take 
one major member state to develop shale gas 
commercially and reap the ‘on-shoring effect’ of 
energy-intensive manufacturing to trigger 
reconsideration of the value of shale gas 
production in many European capitals.27 
Much greater global gas liquidity coupled with 
access to varied sources of gas supply – LNG, 
shale gas as LNG and eventually European shale 
gas – puts Gazprom’s market model under 
immense pressure. LNG fuels the European spot 
market price which creates both an alternative 
                                                   
26 There is a similar issue with regard to deep water 
Caspian gas. One question hovering over the 
Southern Corridor is whether gas from the deep 
water Caspian will be economic to develop in a more 
liquid European market. It may well be that if the 
Southern Corridor is developed, then the gas may be 
sourced in greater quantities from Iraq than from 
deep water Caspian. 
27 What is often overlooked in the debate on shale in 
Europe is the immense multiplier effect on the US 
economy from shale gas development. It is not just 
access to lower fuel prices for consumers. It is also a 
major stimulus to energy-intensive manufacturing 
leading to a rebuilding of US manufacturing 
competitiveness. If one major member state were to 
develop shale gas with some determination and at 
scale, that state would gain a significant competitive 
advantage over the other member states. It is likely 
that in such circumstances that a number of states 
would reconsider their position with regard to shale 
gas development. For an assessment of the impact of 
shale gas on the US economy, see IHS Global Insight, 
The Economic and Employment Contributions of Shale Gas 
in the United States, Washington, D.C., 2011. 
source of supply and an alternative pricing 
model for European gas. EU third-party access 
rules allow energy-intensive users access to the 
spot market, and as more gasification terminals 
come on stream, many more customers will seek 
cheaper spot market price gas.28  
Gas market liquidity and diversity therefore 
pose an existential threat to the traditional 
Gazprom model of a network of long-term 
supply contracts with domestic dominant 
incumbent. Those contracts, with their resale 
prohibitions; take-and-pay clauses and price 
indexation to the oil price, and usually for most 
of a customer’s supply over a long time period 
(more than 15 years) are already under pressure 
from these new market developments.  
3. The Gazprom investigation in the 
context of antitrust 
It is difficult to allege that DG Competition is 
somehow unfairly focusing its attention on 
Gazprom. The Gazprom investigation is part of a 
much larger programme initiated in the late 
1990s to bring about a fully functioning and 
operational single market in gas. This 
programme includes the first,29 second30 and 
third31 energy packages and the Sectoral Inquiry 
into the electricity and gas markets launched in 
                                                   
28 There are currently 20 LNG gasification terminals in 
operation in Europe of which six are undergoing 
expansion of gasification capacity. Foreign investment 
decisions have been taken on a further six and they 
are now in the process of construction. A further 32 
LNG gasification plants are being considered across 
the continent. Even by 2015, it is estimated that there 
will be 259bcm of gasification capacity across the 
European Union. For further information, see Gas 
Infrastructure Europe (www.gie.eu). 
29 Directive 98/30/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council concerning the Common Rules for 
the Internal Market in Natural Gas, OJ 1998 L204/1. 
30 Directive 03/55/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council concerning the Common Rules for 
the Internal Market in Natural Gas and Repealing 
Directive 98/30/EC, OJ 2003 L176/57 
31 Directive 09/73/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council concerning the Common Rules for 
the Internal Market in Natural Gas and Repealing 
Directive 03/55/EC, OJ 2009 L211/94. 
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June 2005.32 The Sectoral Inquiry was a major 
investigation into anti-competitive activity across 
the European electricity and gas markets. The 
evidence provided by DG Competition, which 
was largely overlooked by the media and most 
commentators, indicated that there was 
widespread anti-competitive activity across both 
sectors.  
This evidence amounts to a standing indictment 
of the capital misallocation, consumer loss and 
damage to competitiveness caused by the 
vertically integrated national energy champion 
model adopted in so many member states.33 The 
Commission identified very high levels of 
market concentration notwithstanding the 
liberalisation process already undertaken. 
Significant evidence of vertical foreclosure of 
national markets, combined with lack of cross-
border sales and of market transparency and 
defective price formation. It also found little 
competition in downstream markets and that 
balancing markets favoured domestic 
incumbents.34 
The Inquiry also provided the Commission with 
good reasons to press ahead in prosecuting 
energy companies for breach of the competition 
rules and evidence with which to do so. Over a 
dozen major European energy companies were 
prosecuted including EDF,35 GDF/Suez,36 E.ON37 
and RWE.38 
                                                   
32 Sector Inquiry Pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation 
1/2003 in the European Electricity and Gas Markets, 
Communication by Ms. Neelie Kroes in Agreement with 
Mr Piebalgs, Brussels June 2005. 
33 In fact, the mirror image of the Gazprom model. 
34 Communication from the Commission, Inquiry 
Pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No.1/2003 
into the European Gas and Electricity Sectors (Final 
Report). COM (2006) 851 Final, January 10th 2007, 5-9. 
For a more detailed analysis, see DG Competition 
Report on Energy Sector Inquiry, SEC (2006) 1724, 10th 
January 2007, Part 1 Gas Market Report. 
35 EDF, Long-Term Contracts in France, COMP/39.386, 
March 2010. 
36 E.ON/GDF, Market Allocation in European Gas 
Markets, Case COMP/39.401; GDF Foreclosure, Case 
Comp/B-1/39.316. 
37 E.ON/GDF, op. cit. and E.ON Gas Foreclosure, 
Comp/B-1/39.317. 
38 RWE, Gas Foreclosure, COMP/39.402. 
For the Commission the Gazprom case is 
therefore an issue of completing a wider 
investigation into the enforcement of the 
competition rules in the context of the object of 
creating a liberalised European gas market. The 
Commission has finally turned eastward to 
apply those rules to the member states that 
joined in 2004 and 2007. 
We know that the Commission received at least 
one formal complaint from the Lithuanian 
government with respect to exploitative pricing 
in their gas market. Lithuania is a ‘gas island’. It 
currently receives all of its gas from Gazprom. 
The price it pays for its gas varies but in recent 
years it has been significantly higher than prices 
paid by Gazprom customers in Western 
Europe.39 In the autumn of 2011, DG 
Competition also undertook a number of 
unannounced inspections or ‘dawn raids’ of the 
business premises of Gazprom in the Czech 
Republic and Germany, as well as at a number of 
other energy companies with contractual 
relations with Gazprom across the Central and 
Eastern Europe states.40 
One particular lesson can be learnt from the 
existence of the dozen or so cases in which DG 
Competition has actually prosecuted energy 
companies by filing a prosecution document (the 
Statement of Objections). In most cases rather 
than an issuing a prohibition decision, DG 
Competition used the threat of the publication of 
a 400+ page prohibition decision to encourage 
settlement via a Commitment Decision. For 
example, E.ON and RWE were both faced with a 
prohibition decision which, if published, would 
have set out chapter and verse the nature of their 
breaches of EU antitrust law. Worse still, 
publication would have provided energy-
intensive customers of E.ON and RWE with a 
route map to bring civil claims for damages. One 
major issue for energy companies is that, unlike 
                                                   
39 “Vilnius to Hit at Gazprom in EU Complaint”, 
Financial Times, January 2011.  
40 EU Competition Law-Dawn Raids, Gazprom Case, 27th 
September 2011 (http://www.graystoncompany.com/ 
gco/gaco-blog/entry/eu-update-competition-law-
dawn-raids). This blog provides a useful map 
indicating the location of the Commission’s 
unannounced inspections under Art. 20 of Regulation 
1/2003 (known as dawn raids) in September 2011 in 
respect of the Gazprom investigation. 
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other forms of abuse of dominance and even 
price-fixing cartel cases, the damages claims 
could potentially be very large. This is because of 
the length of period for which many of the 
alleged anti-competitive activities have been 
going on.41 In some cases, there are allegations 
that the cases stretch back to the 1970s.42  
Not unreasonably and as a consequence, E.ON 
and RWE were happy to seek a formal 
Commitment Decision which meant that the full 
nature of the allegations against those firms did 
not enter the public domain. However, the price 
was high. In both cases, DG Competition insisted 
on the ‘unbundling’ of their electricity and gas 
networks. The question that has to be asked in 
the case of Gazprom is whether the Gazprom 
Board and the Kremlin will be willing to give DG 
Competition its ‘pound of flesh’. There is likely 
to be a very significant gap between the price 
that they are willing to pay for a settlement and 
the price that DG Competition is willing to 
accept, even when facing the prospect of 
publication of a prohibition decision, fines and 
civil damages.43 If this view of the case is correct, 
                                                   
41 It is not sufficient to defend Gazprom from claims 
going back many years to argue that such claims can 
only start from accession. This is true of EU 
competition claims. However, from the mid-1990s at 
the latest, all accession states that joined the European 
Union in 2004 and 2007 had to introduce into national 
law by virtue of the Europe Agreements, homologue 
antitrust provisions mirrored on EU antitrust law. 
Hence it is conceivable that claims could be made 
going back to the mid-1990s. There would, however, 
be the prospect of a defence for Gazprom based on 
limitation periods applicable under national law. One 
of the major issues for any national court case for 
damages would be whether there was a continuing 
breach of national rules which would then permit a 
claim to be made for the period before 2004 or 2007 
when only national law would apply. 
42 In the GDF/E.ON Market Allocation case, the core 
allegation concerned an initial agreement dating back 
to 1975, GDF/E.ON, op. cit. 
43 Plaintiffs seeking to obtain civil damages against 
Gazprom may be able to extend the rule in Case C-
360/09 Pfeiderer AG v. Bundeskartellamt, ECJ, 14 June 
2011. In that case the Court indicated that EU law 
does not prohibit access to leniency documents 
(documents obtained in respect of a price-fixing 
cartel) by plaintiffs seeking damages. The issue the 
Court ruled was one for national law. There is a 
difference between documents obtained under a 
then a settlement via a Commitments Decision 
will be difficult to secure. 
It is also difficult to believe that political pressure 
on DG Competition will have much influence. In 
neither GE/Honeywell nor Microsoft, both 
commenced when the United States was at the 
height of its political and economic power were 
affected by US political pressure. Equally, DG 
Competition’s record within the European Union 
is one of a determination to ensure full 
application of the competition acquis even 
against ingrained and powerful member state 
views in favour of corporate champions in 
sectors from airlines, to chemicals to energy 
markets. Even in the course of the economic 
crisis, DG Competition has not flinched from 
continuing to apply the competition rules in full. 
The European Union has seen no equivalent to 
the US National Industrial Recovery Act 1933 
which suspended the operation of the 
competition rules in specific market sectors 
during the Great Depression.44 
                                                                                     
leniency application and deployed in a prohibition 
decision and obtaining documents under a 
Commitment Decision. One can argue that the 
operation of Commitment Decisions would be 
undermined if documentation obtained for that 
purpose were available for damages claims. The 
difficulty is that the same argument could be made 
for leniency applications. In the United States, the 
government has taken steps to limit leniency 
applications liability in order to maintain the 
incentive to come forward. The underlying argument 
is the same for both cases that plaintiffs have a right 
to damages under EU law and if public authorities 
(either EU or national) have documentary evidence 
that would assist their case, there is a lawful EU right 
to obtain that documentation, subject only to 
legitimate business confidentiality. 
44 Although the US judiciary has referred to the 
Sherman Act as the “Magna Carta of Free Enterprise” 
in United States v. Topco Associates Inc (1972) 405 US 
596, 610, per Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Sherman 
Act is not part of the US Constitution and is not 
entrenched within the American legal system. This 
does mean that under extreme political stress, as 
during the Great Depression, the antitrust regime can 
buckle. Such buckling is far more difficult to achieve 
within the EU’s legal order because of the 
constitutional status of Arts 101 and 102. Being 
entrenched within the EU’s legal order, it is much 
more difficult for any of the core parts of the law to be 
overridden by Parliament or Council and political 
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In the energy sector specifically, DG Competition 
has admirably held the line and continued to 
prosecute the major European energy companies 
in the teeth of political opposition from a number 
of powerful member states. If DG Competition 
could withstand political opposition from within 
the European Union, they will be surely in a 
better position to withstand opposition when it 
comes from Gazprom and the Kremlin. 
Furthermore, given the complaint from 
Lithuania, and the support Lithuania has 
received from several other member states, DG 
Competition has to be aware of the danger of 
any sub-optimal resolution of the case resulting 
in a challenge to any weak Commitment 
Decision. It would be an unimaginable political 
disaster for DG Competition to have member 
states launching an application to challenge a 
Commitment Decision or bringing an action for 
failure to act. 
More fundamentally, the difficulty here for 
Gazprom is that, if these allegations are true, 
they involve substantial ‘hard-core’ offences 
under European antitrust law. DG Competition 
then has no alternative but to apply the acquis. 
Denial of third-party access; suppression of 
market access; prohibition on resale and 
exploitative pricing are all serious antitrust 
offences. The Commission cannot simply ‘turn a 
blind eye’ as a result of political pressure coming 
from within or outside the Union. 
4. The Gazprom case 
The launch of DG Competition’s case against 
Gazprom involves in essence three principal 
allegations with respect to resale obligations, 
suppression of alternative competition and 
pricing. Whilst the allegations may appear 
technical, if proved they could have a major 
negative impact on Gazprom’s current business 
model and operations. 
4.1 Allegation of resale protection: The 
‘destination clauses’ 
The first allegation is concerned with resale 
prohibition or destination clauses. These are 
clauses and/or market practices that have the 
                                                                                     
pressure comes finds it much more difficult to gain 
traction. 
effect of preventing the resale of gas contracted 
from Gazprom to third parties. This is a 
particularly onerous provision because the long-
term supply contracts are also subject to take-
and-pay clauses, which force Gazprom 
customers to take all quantities of gas that have 
been contracted for even if there is not a market 
for such gas. Furthermore, the contract will 
usually be for a very high percentage of total 
consumption. 
Such clauses will be viewed by DG Competition 
as hard-core antitrust restrictions to the extent 
they have the effect of splitting up the single 
market and undermining the creation of a single 
market in gas. This is due to the fact that resale 
clauses essentially prohibit onward sales across 
national borders, which is an inherent restriction 
on the free movement of goods across the single 
market. If such clauses or practices are found, 
DG Competition must seek their termination.  
If the case consisted only of resale prohibition 
clauses, then DG Competition and Gazprom 
could relatively easily undertake a settlement, as 
was done informally at the beginning of the 
century with respect to long-term supply 
contracts with Western European customers.45 
4.2 Allegations concerning denial or 
limits on third-party access 
However, the second head of allegations is 
potentially much more serious: prevention of the 
diversification of the supply of gas. This includes 
denial of third-party access to pipelines as 
competitors of Gazprom seek, and are refused, 
access to sell their gas. This could have been 
achieved by Gazprom’s ownership of 
downstream assets, or through its minority 
shareholdings in downstream assets combined 
with its market power derived from its 
monopoly or quasi-monopoly supply of gas. 
What will be particularly interesting to see is 
what other prevention or restriction of supply 
issues arise from the case. These could include 
seeking as a dominant company to impede 
alternative supply projects not under its control 
                                                   
45 “Commission reaches breakthrough with Gazprom 
and ENI on territorial restriction clauses”, 
Commission Press Release, 6th October 2003, 
IP/03/1345. 
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such as LNG gasification stations or proposed 
new pipelines. These issues will depend on the 
evidence available to DG Competition as a result 
of the unannounced raids it carried out on 
Gazprom’s premises and that of other energy 
firms and information obtained via 
complainants. 
The difficulty for Gazprom is that unlike Section 
2 of the Sherman Act, which deals with abuse of 
dominance via claims for monopolization, the 
EU’s abuse of dominance provision has a much 
wider reach. The EU General Court and the 
European Court of Justice have resisted taking a 
narrower economic approach to the 
interpretation of Art. 102 TFEU, the abuse of 
dominance provision. They have reiterated the 
existing case law which emphasises the ‘special 
responsibility’ of dominant companies to respect 
competition and competitors and the traditional 
‘as if’ standard which requires dominant 
companies to act as if there is competition in the 
market. This standard of responsibility may well 
be difficult for Gazprom to entirely reconcile 
with its current business practices.  
4.3 Allegations of unfair pricing 
The third issue raised is unfair pricing, in 
particular, the linking of the price of gas to oil 
(oil price indexation). Price indexation in long-
term gas contracts is perceived to be at the very 
heart of Gazprom’s ability to maintain revenues 
and pricing power. However, it is open to 
question whether it is acceptable under EU 
antitrust law. The questions to be decided by DG 
Competition are whether or not a dominant 
company in the gas supply sector can link its 
prices to oil when there is no basis in modern gas 
markets for such a link and, whether such a link 
constitutes of itself an abuse of dominance. 
Historically the link made some sense as oil was 
also used for heating and power generation. 
However, since the oil price shock of 1973 non-
transportation utilization of oil has declined 
dramatically in significance. Only 2.6% of 
Europe’s power generation is from oil, whereas, 
power generation from gas is 23.6%46 and 
                                                   
46 Gross Electricity Generation by Fuel in 2010, 82, 
Energy in the EU 2012, Eurostat Luxembourg 
(http://ec.europa.eu/energy/publications/doc/2012
_energy_figures.pdf). 
represents more than 70% of total gas 
consumption.  
If indexation were to be found to be abusive the 
consequences could be profound and go well 
beyond the markets of the Central and Eastern 
Europe states. In the first place such a ruling, if 
upheld by the EU courts, would potentially be 
applied by arbitration panels seeking to dispose 
of arguments between Gazprom and Western 
European energy companies challenging 
indexation under arbitration clauses. Arbitration 
panels have an obligation to apply EU antitrust 
law in cases where the governing law of the case 
is the law of a member state, and where as a 
consequence EU law would also apply. The 
danger therefore is of a significant spill over into 
many other disputes over indexation, at least 
where Gazprom reaches the dominance 
threshold.47 
It is also likely that any European ruling against 
indexation will be used worldwide to challenge 
its legitimacy. For instance, it is likely that China, 
currently in negotiations with Gazprom over the 
price it is willing to pay for gas from Eastern 
Siberia, will deploy antitrust arguments to seek 
to avoid prices linked to oil. It could also spur a 
new round of arbitration cases as Gazprom’s 
customers in Western Europe begin to argue that 
a Commission decision outlawing indexation 
and upheld by the EU courts constitutes a major 
structural change or ‘event’ in the market 
triggering a price review under their existing 
contracts.48 This could then result in almost 
every existing long term supply contract with 
Gazprom being challenged via arbitration panels 
across the continent. 
The timeline for such a case of this complexity 
and weight is probably approximately two years 
to a prohibition decision and a further two years 
before disposal of the main issues in the EU 
General Court. There may be both an appeal on 
                                                   
47 The bright line test for dominance is usually 
thought of applying at above 40%. Depending on 
market conditions, such as barriers to entry and 
concentration dominance can fall below and above 
40%. 
48 For a discussion of price review triggers, see B. 
Holland and P.S. Ashley, “Natural Gas Price Reviews: 
Past, Present and Future”, Journal of Energy and 
Natural Resources Law, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2012. 
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point of law to the European Court of Justice, 
which could take a further two years. In 
addition, as in Microsoft, if there is resistance to 
any prohibition there could be a number of 
satellite decisions and cases to the main decision. 
5. Russia’s initial reaction 
The initial Russian reaction has been to introduce 
a Federal Decree under which all ‘strategic 
enterprises’ to obtain consent for their foreign 
economic activity with the government.49 
Strategic enterprises and their subsidiaries will 
in future only be able to disclose information to 
foreign governments and international 
organisations with the consent of the Russian 
government. Consent will also be required to 
amendments to contracts and commercial 
pricing policy. 
Practically this blocking statute is likely to have 
very little effect. In the first place DG 
Competition has already raided Gazprom’s 
offices in the Czech Republic and Germany. It 
has also been able to obtain information from 
other energy companies Gazprom does business 
with and from complainants. In respect of the 
Federal Decree it looks like a case of shutting the 
door after the horse has bolted.  
Even after the Decree, it is open to question how 
effective it will be. While there is European 
Union case law that state compulsion provides a 
defence to EU competition obligations this 
would not necessarily cover all information 
gathering exercises.50 DG Competition may 
decide not to ask Gazprom officials to answer 
questions under threat of enforcement sanctions 
                                                   
49 Presidential Decree to help Gazprom in Standoff with 
European Commission, ITAR-TASS, 12 September 2012 
(http://www.itar-tass.com/en/c39/518529.html). 
50 There is little case law on the position of foreign 
sovereigns who issue compulsory rules binding their 
companies to breach the competition rules. Respected 
commentators suggest that in such circumstances the 
state compulsion doctrine that applies to national 
measures would apply to measures of a foreign 
sovereign. They would however have to be 
compulsory, i.e. requiring a company to act in a way 
that infringed the competition rules. See E. Roth, 
Bellamy & Child EU Law of Competition, para11.004, 
Oxford, 2008.  
under Art. 18 of Regulation 1 given the Federal 
Decree.51  
However, there is nothing to stop DG 
Competition issuing Art. 18 decisions against 
Gazprom allies and commercial partners within 
the European Union. It is also open to question 
how far any Federal Decree would be given 
effect to in the European Union in respect of 
Member State registered companies operating 
within the Union. In addition, it may in fact 
encourage DG Competition to undertake more 
unannounced inspections against Gazprom 
instead.52 The point about raids is that they can 
be carried out without the co-operation of the 
officials and employees of the business with the 
Commission calling upon the police power of the 
local Member States to undertake its search.53 
Equally it is open to question how effective state 
consent to contractual changes and pricing 
policy can be in protecting Gazprom from DG 
Competition’s investigation. Again the Federal 
Decree may in fact encourage DG Competition to 
take more coercive structural measures against 
Gazprom rather than seeking contractual 
amendments.54  
For instance if DG Competition is faced with 
evidence of suppression of alternative 
competitors via Gazprom’s ownership and 
                                                   
51 Art. 18 permits the Commission to seek answers to 
questions in respect of antitrust investigation under 
the threat of significant financial sanctions against the 
target company. These Art. 18 requests are usually 
made following an unannounced inspection on the 
business premises of the target company. 
52 Under Arts 20 and 21 of Regulation 1/2003. 
53 Bellamy & Child, op. cit., para 13.045 
54 Under Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003 the 
Commission’s power to terminate infringements 
includes the power to impose ‘behavioural or 
structural remedies which are proportionate to the 
infringement committed and which are necessary to 
bring the infringement to an end’. The limit to any 
structural measures lies in the strength of the link 
between the antitrust offence and the proposed 
measures. For instance, if it was demonstrated that 
downstream assets owned or controlled by Gazprom 
were a significant facilitator in respect of denial of 
third party access to competitors then one option for 
the Commission to consider would to order the sale of 
such assets. For further discussion see Bellamy & 
Child, op. cit., para 13.128.  
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control of pipeline assets, it can order sale of 
those assets if it finds it difficult to negotiate with 
Moscow because of a blocking statute. It can take 
such action under Art. 7 of Regulation 1 when 
there is a connection between the assets and the 
antitrust behaviour uncovered in the 
investigation. This would suggest that 
Gazprom’s pipeline assets in the affected regions 
of the EU, including potentially minority 
shareholdings in pipeline assets, could be 
required to be sold. Given that the assets are on 
the territory of the member states, it is difficult to 
see how any Russian Federation statute blocking 
such sales would be given effect by the EU 
courts. In addition, the Commission can avoid 
direct conflict with a blocking statute55 by 
appointing a monitoring trustee. Such a trustee 
was appointed in the Microsoft case.56 The trustee 
could police the pipeline assets of corporate 
allies, other Russian energy companies and 
favoured customers of Gazprom for whom there 
is evidence that they have or are likely to take 
instructions from Gazprom.  
A particular difficulty here is that any attempt to 
invoke state compulsion would only apply 
prospectively. It is doubtful that either the 
European Commission or ultimately the 
European Court of Justice would accept the 
application of a retrospective state compulsion 
doctrine. If this view of the approach of the 
Commission and Court is correct, DG 
Competition would be able at least to fine 
Gazprom for past behaviour whatever the 
contents of this or any future Federal Decree.57 
There is also the further difficulty that most of 
the acts that DG Competition allege occurred in 
whole or in part on the territory of the member 
                                                   
55 There may well a formal conflict in that a ‘no asset 
sales’ rule may apply in the blocking statute. 
However, as argued above, such a rule would be seen 
as interference in the sovereignty of the member 
states and would not be applied by the EU courts. 
56 Bellamy & Child, op. cit., para 13.130. 
57 There is little law on this point. However, as a 
matter of principle, it is difficult to see how the EU 
Courts would accept retrospective compulsion 
doctrines as a defence to antitrust liability. In the only 
case on the books – AROW/BNIC OJ 1982 L379/1 – a 
Commission decision applied the antitrust rules in 
full where a state had attempted to retrospectively 
immunise acts in contravention of those rules. 
states and involved Gazprom-controlled 
companies registered in EU or EEA states. The 
Commission and the Court may well take the 
view that the Federal Decree when applied to 
such acts is a direct interference in the national 
sovereignty of the member states.  
This view of the impact of the Federal Decree is 
likely to be reinforced with respect to the 
argument that the EU institutions and its 
member states have a sovereign right to 
structure and re-structure their energy supply as 
they see fit. Attempts by a foreign government to 
seek to maintain a particular energy system on 
the territory of other states is an interference 
with those states’ sovereign rights. 
The argument here is underpinned by two 
observations. First, although the defence of the 
Commission’s position can be made under the 
traditional territoriality principle of jurisdiction, 
the Commission recognises a broader-based 
‘effects’-like jurisdictional doctrine. Drawing 
from the Wood Pulp58 and Gencor59 case law, the 
EU courts have developed a doctrine of extra-
territoriality. This doctrine permits European 
Union law to extend to operations, agreements 
and practices which although they are initiated 
outside the Union are implemented or have an 
immediate, substantial and foreseeable effect on 
the territory of the member states. 
The Russian Federation could seek to argue as in 
Gencor that as a matter of comity to take account 
of important policy concerns of other states 
where the contested practices were initiated, 
European antitrust law should not be applied. 
There are a number of problems with this 
approach. First, although a balancing of interests 
comity doctrine has been recognised by some US 
superior courts, it has not been recognised by the 
EU courts.60 Second, as discussed above, it is 
                                                   
58 Joined Cases C-89/85 et seq [1988] ECR 5193. 
59 Case T-102/96 [1999] ECR II-753. 
60 See Timberlane Lumber Co v. Bank of America [1976] 
549 F.2d 597. This case should now be read alongside 
the US Federal Statute, the Foreign Trade Antitrust 
Improvements Act 1982, adopted post-Timberlane 
and the  ruling of the US Supreme Court in F.Hoffman 
La Roche Ltd v. Empagran SA [2004] 542 US 155. The 
nearest explicit discussion comes in Eastern 
Aluminium OJ 1985 L92/1. In that case, the 
Commission indicated that it would be appropriate to 
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difficult to see how the Commission and the EU 
Courts would permit the sovereign rights of a 
foreign state to prevail on the territory of the 
member states over such a primary objectives of 
European Union law as the creation of a single 
market in gas, free flow of gas across national 
borders, market liberalisation and full 
application of Union antitrust rules. The 
difficulty with any comity argument in the 
Gazprom case is that it would be to accept a 
Russian argument for a largely extra-territorial 
application of Russian objectives on the soil of 
the member states. 
Thirdly, to the extent that the EU itself is making 
some extra-territorial claims, it is also worth 
pointing out that the Russian competition law 
applies the same EU extra-territorial jurisdiction. 
This existence of a Russian ‘effects doctrine’ 
significantly weakens the Russian case against 
the Commission’s jurisdiction in the Gazprom 
case, to the extent that the Union makes such 
claims in the case.61  
                                                                                     
show self-restraint in the exercise of jurisdiction when 
it would require undertakings to act contrary to the 
requirements of national law or the important 
interests of non-member states. It went on to suggest 
however that such interests would have to be so 
important that they would prevail over the Treaty-
based objectives of European competition law. The 
difficulty, it is submitted, with that approach from the 
perspective of Gazprom is that Eastern Aluminium was 
decided prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union 
when the Community had to grapple with applying 
the competition rules with respect to entities from an 
avowedly non-market state command economy. By 
contrast, the Russian Federation is formally 
committed to an open market economy, reinforced by 
its 1991 enactment of a competition law and the 
improvements in the law over the last two decades. It 
is difficult to see therefore how the application of core 
competition rules by the European Commission to 
entities that operate within the territory of the 
member states would ever be able to mount a 
successful claim to their own state interests to be 
prioritized over those of the Union. 
61 Art. 3(2) on the Federal Law on Protection of 
Competition reads: “Provisions of this Federal Law 
are applicable to the agreements reached between 
Russian and (or) foreign persons or organisations 
outside the Russian Federation, as well as to actions 
performed by them, if such agreements or actions 
affect the state of competition in the Russian 
Federation.” Translation from the Russian Federal 
The second observation is to look at the one 
country that maintained a principled stand 
against extra-territorial antitrust claims of the 
United States for over a century. It is worth 
contrasting the approach of the United Kingdom 
which for more than 100 years maintained a 
principled stand against the United States with 
respect to the US effects doctrine. The UK even 
adopted what is the world’s most sophisticated 
antitrust blocking statute in the Protection of 
Trading Interests Act 1980.62 The UK’s position 
was credible in international law as it has based 
its position on the traditional territoriality 
principle and sustained it for decades. It never 
made extra-territorial claims itself. By contrast, 
as explained above, the Russian government 
makes the same claims as the European Union 
and has done since the modern inception of 
Russian competition law in the 1990s. It is 
difficult for the Russian Federation therefore 
now to turn round and run a compelling 
territorial argument calling for restricted 
sovereignty with regard to the impact of EU 
antitrust laws on one of its major companies. 
There will no doubt be an extensive debate and 
argument over the application of the competition 
rules in a context of a foreign state supporting an 
alleged antitrust delinquent.  However, what the 
Kremlin seems to have overlooked is the damage 
the wrangling over the case is likely to have 
Gazprom’s already-precarious hold over Central 
and Eastern Europe states. 
The greatest commercial danger is that just as 
with the 2009 gas cut-off, Russian over-reaction 
in the Gazprom case will undermine the 
company’s market position. Once the member 
states see more threats and threats of non-
compliance with EU law coming out of Moscow, 
they will start accelerating their search for new 
gas sources, be it shale gas, LNG or new pipeline 
sources. In other words, by taking an aggressive 
confrontational approach to DG Competition’s 
investigation, Gazprom would actually be 
undermining its own market position. 
                                                                                     
Antimonopoly Service’s website 
(http://en.fas.gov.ru/legislation/legislation_50915.ht
ml). 
62 A.V. Lowe, “Blocking Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: 
The British Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980”, 
American Journal of International Law, 1981. 
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6. Settlement proposals and 
conclusions 
As a matter of enlightened self-interest, the 
Kremlin should be seeking to use the Gazprom 
case to force change within the company and in 
the broader Russian gas market. Leaving 
Gazprom as the dominant player in the 
exploration, production, wholesale and retail 
levels of the market, combined with its export 
and pipeline monopoly is not good for Russian 
economic development or for Russian 
consumers. The ability of gas independents such 
as Novatek to challenge Gazprom will always be 
limited under current market and regulatory 
conditions.  
Aside from the immediate inefficiencies in the 
Russian gas market derived from such market 
dominance, there is the broader problem of the 
declining Nadym pur Taz fields where 
approximately 80% of Russian gas is produced. 
One major new field is being brought on-stream. 
However, according to the IEA, Russia will have 
to replace 635bcm of production by 2035, that is, 
approximately 80% of current production. The 
cost of new investment in gas fields and 
transmission networks is put at $730 billion.63  
By contrast the main focus of current Gazprom 
investment policy is to build Nordstream 3 and 4 
and Southstream. These are essentially 
diversionary pipelines which do not tackle the 
scale of investment required in new fields and 
transmission upgrade to the main Russian 
pipeline network, the UGSS. 
Furthermore, the threat of cheaper gas supplies 
entering Europe as LNG or domestic shale gas, 
and the prospect of gas or coal dumping should 
make the Kremlin question mammoth 
development projects like Bovanenko.64 The 
danger for Gazprom is that if it continues with a 
high-priced energy development strategy, it will 
find it difficult to raise the investment for its new 
fields or face the prospect of huge losses on its 
gas sales. 
                                                   
63 IEA, World Energy Outlook 2011, 310, Paris. 
64 For a discussion of Russian resources, see Y. Grama, 
“Analysis of Russian Oil and Gas Reserves”, 
International Journal of Energy Economics and 
Policy, Vol. 82, 2012. 
There is an alternative. Gazprom has huge gas 
resources, including shale gas and secondary 
conventional fields, around its existing pipeline 
infrastructure. There is a compelling argument to 
develop these cheaper to develop resources than 
resources in the high north or in the Arctic Sea. 
However, to develop these resources, a degree of 
market efficiency, high-level technology and 
market competition would be necessary to 
ensure effective development. In other words a 
liberalised market structure would be required 
which would put a premium on efficiency and 
innovation. The real question here is whether the 
Kremlin would be willing to contemplate some 
degree of market liberalisation for access to 
cheaper and more substantial gas resources.  
There is also a major opportunity for the Russian 
gas market if the Kremlin decides to liberalise. 
The shale gas revolution does not only affect 
Gazprom, it also is having a profound effect on 
the European energy market. Current climate 
change strategy is running into the sand, in the 
face of rising costs and economic crisis. The 
Union is going to be forced to develop an 
alternative approach around deploying more gas 
and reducing coal in order to cut CO2 emissions 
in the short to medium term.65 It is also likely 
that Europe will follow the US example of 
increasingly switching to gas transportation. As 
a consequence, the size of the gas market will 
expand in Europe. For the Russian gas market, 
such an expansion would be a significant 
opportunity to increase gas sales. 
The Kremlin should be giving serious 
consideration to negotiating a Commitment 
Decision with DG Competition that puts 
                                                   
65 The advantage of gas during the economic crisis is 
underlined by the European Gas Advocacy Forum 
in their paper “Making the Green Journey Work”, 
Brussels, 2011. That paper points out that CCGT gas 
turbines in Europe have a load factor of 
approximately 45%. If the load factor was raised from 
45% to 65% to 70%, and assuming the equivalent 
amount of coal fired generation was removed, the 
CO2 abatement would be on the order of 300 million 
tonnes annually, approximately one-third of CO2 
emissions from coal and lignite in the European 
Union. To achieve the same CO2 abatement by 
deploying current renewable technology would cost 
approximately €80-120 billion of new capital 
expenditures. 
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pressure on Gazprom to face up to liberalisation. 
This would involve as part of the decision 
accepting the unbundling rules; selling or 
isolating downstream assets from supply 
operations and providing more gas into existing 
hubs. Internally, the case should be made to 
liberalise the market in order to keep prices low 
domestically and enable Russian gas to be 
competitive on the European market. 
Sadly, it looks unlikely that the Kremlin will act 
in Russia’s own enlightened self-interest. If the 
Federal Decree is any guide, there is likely to be 
resistance at every stage of the EU’s antitrust 
process. The recent Rosneft/BP-TNK deal 
suggests that the focus of Russian power and 
interest is now concentrated entirely upon the oil 
industry. The Kremlin’s strategy may come 
down to the view that oil prices will not move 
far from $100 per barrel a day and the industry 
will be able to deliver approximately 10 million 
b/d. As a consequence, rather than seeing the 
Russian gas market as something that is core to 
the state’s revenues, it may instead be seen as 
source of power that is to be defended. In that 
case, the consequence may be that EU-Russia 
relations are in for a rough ride.  
We therefore face the prospect of DG 
Competition legitimately applying the 
procedures, legislation and case law of the 
Union’s antitrust acquis in a methodical 
evidence-based manner. At each step of the 
process, an increasingly exasperated Kremlin 
will be furiously lobbying major EU capitals to 
bring the process to a halt. The explanations 
from London, Berlin and Paris as to the 
application of the rule of law and the autonomy 
of the Commission will be disbelieved. There is 
therefore the prospect that in a stand-off between 
the Venusian Europeans and the Martian 
Russians66 we will see a slash-and-burn gas 
policy from an uncomprehending and furious 
Moscow. In turn, DG Competition in Venusian 
mode will respond by assessing any acts by 
Gazprom in terms of compliance or non-
compliance with the Union’s antitrust acquis. 
This Martian incomprehension and fury, 
                                                   
66 With apologies to Professor Robert Kagan and his 
work, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the 
New World Order, New York, NY: Random House, 
2003. 
responded to with Venusian legality and 
evidence-based procedure is not likely to end 
well or assist EU-Russian relations in the short 
term. 
If this latter scenario comes to fruition, Moscow 
should understand that threats of serious or 
actual disturbance to gas supplies to the member 
states will be self-defeating. Faced with threats 
from Moscow, the member states will indeed 
start drilling for shale gas at scale; the US 
Congress will permit large-scale exports of shale 
gas to permit LNG ‘freedom carriers’ to arrive in 
Europe; the 32 planned LNG gasification 
terminals will move rapidly to final investment 
decisions and offshore exploration in the Eastern 
Mediterranean will proceed at speed. The 
Kremlin in the years after 2012 may finally 
achieve President Ronald Reagan’s goal of 
reducing Russian gas to the supply of last resort, 
while at the same time all but eliminating 
Russian influence across the region.  
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